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Extract

VI. EVALUATION

Intended as the major source of coordinated and evaluated intelligence, on which broad national policy could be soundly based, the Central Intelligence Agency has as yet fallen short of the objective. While it has made progress in organizing and equipping itself, its product, however valid, does not presently enjoy the full confidence of the National Security Organization or of the other

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The Committee was particularly concerned over the Nation's inadequacies in the field of scientific, including medical intelligence. The vital importance of reliable and up-to-date scientific information is such as to call for far greater efforts than appear to have been devoted to this need in the past. Scientists in general have expressed considerable distress at the paucity of information available and the relationship between science and CIA does not seem to be of the best.

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The intelligence agencies of the services, the State Department, and the FBI must do their proper share, and the whole must pull in harness if our intelligence services are to be adequate to the difficult requirements of the atomic age. The very problems that have beset CIA have troubled, to more or less degree, the other intelligence agencies. Of all these problems, one looms largest-- personnel. The skilled and experienced personnel of wartime have in most cases severed their connections with the services; selection and replacement of new personnel have been extremely haphazard. In one of the service's intelligence systems at headquarters, Washington, no Russian linguist is now permanently employed. In Germany, the conduct of the Army's Counter Intelligence Corps, a highly important part of intelligence work, became notorious, yet inherently this was not the fault of the Corps; the personnel assigned to it had no qualifications or training for the work and was often of inadequate caliber. The Army's remedy for this situation was not to improve personnel selection and training, but to order all CIC personnel to wear uniforms, live in barracks, and report for regular Army meals. Under such a regimen they were expected to keep in contact with the local population and to catch spies.

Choice intelligence borths in the services have too often been assigned to officers not particularly wanted by other arms or branches. The capable, experienced, and thoroughly devoted personnel who have specialized in intelligence have too often seen their organizations

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and their systems ruined by superior officers with no experience, little capacity, and no imagination. In the Committee's opinion, it is highly important that an intelligence corps—or at least an intelligence career—be provided by the services and that adequate selection and training systems be inaugurated.

The services must also try to rid their intelligence estimates of subjective bias. Partly because of their natural service interests, partly because of inter-service budgetary competition, our estimates of potential enemy strengths vary widely, depending upon the service that makes them. The Army will stress the potential enemy's ground divisions, the Navy his submarines, the Air Force his planes, and each estimate differs somewhat from the others. In one specific instance, an estimate of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained so many inconsistencies within a single paper that it was considered valueless for planning purposes. Out of this mass of jumbled material, and harassed often by the open and covert opposition of the older agencies, CIA has tried to make sense. That it has not always succeeded has not been entirely the fault of CIA.

Intelligence can best flourish in the shade of silence. But if it is not subjected to scrutiny it could easily stagnate. Another examination, two or three years from now, of our intelligence system should be undertaken, either by a Congressional watchdog committee, or preferably by a committee akin to the Dulles group (described below). The basic framework for a sound intelligence organization

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now exists; yet the material so far produced is by no means adequate to our national safety in this age of "cold war" and the atomic bomb. That framework must be fleshed out by proper personnel and sound administrative measures. Intelligence is the first line of defense.

Dulles Committee

A detailed study of the organization and activities of the intelligence divisions of the government, including CIA, is being made by a committee consisting of Mr. Allan Dulles, Mr. William H. Jackson, and Mr. Mathias Correa, who are assisted by a staff of four directed by Mr. Robert Blum, of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Committee was appointed by the President on the recommendation of the National Security Council. It will make its report with specific recommendations by January 1, 1949. All problems here considered will also be reviewed by the Dulles Committee.

Qualifications of Director

A moot question is whether the Director should be a civilian or a professional military man. The argument in favor of a service man is that he will command more confidence from the armed services who talk his language and will respect his position and security. With a military man, the present pay scale will not prove a deterrent. The job could be developed into one of the top staff assignments available to members of the three services.

Against this, it is said that the position requires a broader background and greater versatility and diplomatic experience than is

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usually found in service personnel; that the best qualified and most competent officers would not accept the position if to do so meant permanent retirement and an end of the road to important command or operational responsibility. If a military man is assigned to the position as a tour of duty, he will, it is said, inevitably be influenced to some degree, in the execution of his duties, by his rank and status as compared with that of other officers with whom he deals. He may also be influenced by concern for his next billet.

The principal argument against a civilian is the difficulty of getting a good one. It will be difficult to attract a man of force, reputation, integrity, and proven administrative ability who has an adequate knowledge of foreign history and politics and is familiar with intelligence technique and the working machinery of the Government and the military establishment. Not only is the pay low in comparison to industry and the professions, but the reward of success is anonymity. The wisdom of putting an individual who lacks intelligence experience in charge simply because he is a competent administrator is dubious. A civilian would have the advantage of being free from taint of service ambitions or rivalries. On the other hand a civilian may be more subject to political pressure than a military man. In certain foreign countries this has occurred. In any event a civilian would have to be a man of commanding reputation and personality in order to secure the respect and cooperation of the services. CIA's relations with the State Department would undoubtedly benefit from the presence of a civilian

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director, known and respected by the Secretary of State and his assistants.

The intrinsic interest of the work, its potential influence on policy, and recognition of public service to be performed might combine to persuade a competent civilian to accept the position. If so, his appointment would seem desirable. A change in the statute that would disqualify a military man is not, however, recommended.

Moreover it would not be wise, at this time at least, to amend the statute to include a mandatory requirement that a military man, appointed as Director, must retire from the service. A competent officer could be persuaded to retire from his service and abandon his career to become Director of CIA only if he felt some assurance of a reasonable tenure of office. That no such assurance exists today appears from the fact that three different Directors have been appointed since January of 1946. A provision requiring the retirement from service of any commissioned officer appointed Director might appropriately be included in the statute—if coupled with provision for adequate retirement pay in case he is removed as Director.

Location

(1) CIA's location under the NSC

CIA must necessarily be centrally located both as a "coordinator" and as an "evaluator." It must work with service intelligence agencies and with agencies outside the National Military Establishment. It must accomplish the allocation of responsibility for collection and research among Government agencies and fulfill

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its responsibility for central evaluation of intelligence free from departmental prejudice, control or bias, whether real or imagined. It must exercise authority through directives issued centrally and must at the same time maintain smooth and constant working relationships with the other departments and services.

It has been suggested that CIA should report directly to the President. One alleged advantage of such an arrangement is that CIA's authority as a coordinator would thus be enhanced, as its directives could be issued as executive orders. Another is that CIA would then report to an individual rather than a committee.

Apart from the question of burdening the President with additional personal responsibility, it is doubtful whether, as a practical matter, he has the time to pay much attention to it. Internal administration will always remain the personal responsibility of the Director of CIA who can be held accountable by the National Security Council, at the instance of any one of its members, as effectively as by the President. It is unlikely that the Director's effectiveness either as a "coordinator" or an "evaluator" would be increased by putting him on a White House level. His estimates would, in all probability, receive neither more nor less attention from the departments if they emanated from the executive office of the President or an appendage thereto. The exercise of CIA's coordination function to allocate responsibilities must, initially at least, be performed on a more or less negotiated basis. Efforts to impose directives concerning the internal workings of a department

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upon officials of the level of the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense are not likely to meet with success.

Suggestions have also been made that CIA should be in the State Department or in the National Military Establishment. But CIA's functions and interests transcend both the military establishment and the State Department. The Army has suggested that the National Security Act be amended to provide "that the Secretary of Defense shall be responsible for coordinating the intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the National Military Establishment," and that CIA "shall deal only with the Secretary of Defense, or such other agency or agencies as he may designate." But inclusion of such a provision would tend to break down the necessarily complicated but established working relationships between CIA and individual agencies, and in any case seems redundant. The Secretary of Defense must be, per se, the coordinator of intelligence and all other activities within the military establishment, and CIA practically must deal with him—as it actually does through the National Security Council. A better mechanism than now exists for coordinating the service intelligence agencies in the Secretary's office could be established, but there should be no artificial restriction of the flexibility and authority needed by CIA. CIA is properly placed under the National Security Council.

(2) Location of "common services" under CIA

Under the statute CIA is entrusted with the performance of such services of common concern as the National Security Council shall

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There is little real dispute that the first four of these functions should be located centrally. The question of where the clandestine operational activities should be located has long been the subject of debate. Wherever located, there is little doubt that they should all be treated together as a single unit.

An objection, sometimes made to continuing espionage under the CIA, is that it creates so complex an administrative burden for the Director as to render it difficult for him to function as an "evaluator"; also that as an "evaluator" he will be prejudiced in favor of

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information preserved by his own service. This objection has some slight validity but must be weighed against serious objection to placing the service elsewhere.

The arguments in favor of control by the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State are in large degree mutually exclusive, and this fact suggests retention of the service in its present spot under a body where both are represented. [Too great a dependence upon the Foreign Service for "cover", communications, and facilities is fatal to any intelligence service and dangerous to the Foreign Service, which would be compromised and embarrassed in case of discovery.] If war should come, any intelligence service too largely dependent upon its Foreign Service would find itself hobbled in enemy countries at the very time when it was most needed. [Other "cover" devices must be found if a clandestine service is to be efficient.]

Considerable thought must be given, however, to the desirability of splitting CIA in time of war and transferring two or three of its five major divisions—certainly the operational services, the open and covert collection of information—to the National Military Establishment, where they could function under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (preferably) or under the Secretary of Defense. If inclusion of these services in the wartime chain of command is deemed desirable, the objective could be facilitated by a slight, and at the same time a desirable, change in CIA's present organization—the grouping of all operations under a Deputy Director who should have considerable, though not unlimited independence. In time of peace, the Deputy

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Director in charge of operations would function under the Director CIA; in time of war he might if necessary report directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.


Continued experience may suggest other changes, but change is disruptive in itself, and one great present need of the intelligence services is a relatively reorganization-free period in which to work out their problems. If at some future time it appears desirable to transfer CIA's operational functions to another agency, the transfer might be accomplished with the approval of the National Security Council, the Director CIA, and the President.

Internal Reorganization

Some changes in the internal structure of CIA, in addition to the grouping of the operating offices under a deputy director, may be needed. The very large number of people employed by CIA in itself suggests that a careful survey should be made of its administrative procedures with a view to greater economy. The administrative division seems too large with danger that the tail may be wagging the dog. The Office of Collection and Dissemination sometimes in the past has acted as a bottleneck but under its new head it appears to be performing an efficient job. Some thought should be given to merging the map services, now under the Office of Research and Estimates, with the other reference facilities under the Office of Collection and Dissemination. The name of this latter office is a misnomer; it probably should become purely a reference service with its full energies devoted to this important work. Its liaison functions might be split

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off to form a separate small section. The Dulles study will undoubtedly make more detailed recommendations for internal reform.

Intelligence Evaluation Board

The greatest need in CIA is the establishment at a high level of a small group of highly capable people, freed from administrative detail, to concentrate upon intelligence evaluation. The Director and his assistants have had to devote so large a portion of their time to administration that they have been unable to give sufficient time to analysis and evaluation. A small group of mature men of the highest talents, having full access to all information, might well be released completely from routine and set to thinking about intelligence only. Many of the greatest failures in intelligence have not been failures in collection, but failures in analyzing and evaluating correctly the information available.

Duplication

There is some duplication in the work done by the Office of Research and Estimates and the work in other governmental intelligence agencies. This duplication is caused in part by the fact that ORE and other agencies, notably the intelligence division of the State Department, but also sections of G-2, ONI, A-2 and even the Department of Commerce, examine the same basic material for the purpose of making intelligence estimates. To some degree this may be inevitable and even desirable as CIA must be in a position to verify the intelligence that it evaluates. Examination of basic material for this purpose might be accomplished with fewer people by placing CIA analysts in

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the message centers and secretariats of the departments and services to sift out really important material for routing to CIA.

The present size of ORE is in considerable measure due to CIA's dependence on its own facilities for research. Research divisions of other agencies are preoccupied with their immediate departmental requirements and are unable to meet or are otherwise unresponsive to CIA's priorities. CIA accordingly tends to do its own basic research. Duplication in the field of economic research can probably be reduced over a period of time by intelligent use of "coordinating" power exercised over many Government agencies.

Duplication in the field of political reporting remains an issue between CIA and the State Department. Some duplication may be justified on the ground that "two guesses are better than one"; also because CIA and the intelligence division of the State Department work with different objectives and different priorities. However, it is now clear in retrospect that it was a mistake to split up the Office of Strategic Services after the war and to assign part of its functions to one department (State) and part to another (Army). This mistake now has been largely remedied by creation of CIA, but its effects linger on in the research and analysis duplication—particularly marked in the economic and political field—between CIA and State. The feasibility of shifting a large part of the State Department's intelligence section to CIA should be studied. If this should prove to be impractical or undesirable, unnecessary duplication should be eliminated by progressive coordination, interchange of personnel, and

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the allocation of specific responsibilities to various agencies by National Security Council directives.

Evaluation and Correlation

This function is currently performed by daily intelligence summaries containing "spot" intelligence items which go to the President, members of the NSC, and others. Weekly and monthly estimates of the world intelligence situation are also prepared as well as estimates of specific situations. These are drawn up from time to time, as occasion arises, on CIA's own initiative or in response to requests from the National Security Council or other agencies, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concerned with national security.

CIA's estimates and surveys are criticized principally on two grounds. One is that as a normal routine they receive insufficient consideration from the policy makers, and are not responsive to their immediate problems and requirements. A second criticism, which is allied to the first, is that CIA estimates are made without access to all relevant information including information concerning activities and decisions of the military services, operational in nature, such as the extent and deployment of the fleet in the Pacific, etc. Both these criticisms have some elements of truth. The military services tend to withhold operational information and the details of military plans on the grounds of security. In formulating plans the State Department tends to rely on its own judgment and information without consulting CIA. Although CIA appears to be supplied with all

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information of a strictly "intelligence" nature, it is not clear that CIA has adequate access to information about operational developments. Yet effective intelligence is possible only when it is closely linked with planning and policy-making.

Plans and decisions affecting national security are presently made at various places; by the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, by the State Department and by the military services individually. These various authorities rely, in formulating their plans and decisions, on the respective departmental intelligence services, on the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Intelligence Group, which is the working body for the JIC, as well as on CIA. If CIA is to perform adequately its function of evaluating and correlating intelligence relating to the national security, it must be aware of, and participate in, the thinking at all these levels.

It is particularly desirable that the association between the Joint Staff and the CIA be as intimate as possible. CIA is the logical arbiter of differences between the services on the evaluation of intelligence. Assumptions made by the Chiefs of Staff both for planning and operational purposes should be formulated with CIA participation or at least reviewed by CIA.

For the purpose of fostering a closer relationship between CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, consideration should be given to including the Director CIA among the membership of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Furthermore, it would seem

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desirable that the Intelligence Advisory Committee meet more frequently to consider questions of substantive intelligence. This would contribute to an interchange of intelligence opinion between the principal intelligence officers of the Government and would in itself insure a closer relationship between CIA and the Joint Intelligence Committee both of which participate in Intelligence Advisory Committee meetings.

It is also desirable that a closer working relationship be established between the sections in CIA responsible for the preparation of estimates and both the National Security Council staff and the Joint Intelligence Group of the Joint Staff.

Scientific Intelligence

Failure properly to appraise the extent of scientific developments in enemy countries may have more immediate and catastrophic consequences than failure in any other field of intelligence. What is needed is a central authority responsible for assimilating all information concerning developments in the field of science abroad and competent to estimate the significance of these developments. This agency obviously must have access to all available information bearing on the problem. It must also be able to provide intelligent direction in the collection of items of information likely to have significance in the scientific field.

At present, responsibility for intelligence evaluation in such fields as biological and chemical warfare, electronics, aerodynamics, developments in guided missiles, etc., is spread amongst various agencies,

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including the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS), G-2, A-2, ONI, and the Atomic Energy Commission as well as CIA. Medical intelligence is virtually non-existent.* Estimates of foreign potentialities made by various agencies are inadequate and contradictory. In CIA itself responsibility for scientific intelligence is divided between the Scientific Branch of ORE and a group concerned with atomic energy. Collection of information concerning scientific developments abroad is clearly inadequate.

On the recommendation of Dr. Vannevar Bush, then Chairman of the R&DB, a scientist of reputation has directed the work of the Scientific Branch of ORE for the past year. He recently resigned** and the office is awaiting the recommendation of a successor by Dr. Compton, who has replaced Dr. Bush. As presently constituted, the Scientific Branch of ORE is not in a position either to evaluate intelligence or to stimulate the collection of necessary information. There is no physician and no mechanism for collecting or evaluating medical intelligence in CIA.

Some of the difficulties presently experienced are inevitable. Any eminent scientist will be impatient with routine regulations, and some "red tape" exists in any government organization. It is desirable, however, that the individual responsible for scientific intelligence

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- * See Chapter XIII, Medical Services and Hospitalization in the Military Services.
 - ** The Committee has been advised that CIA has been successful in finding a satisfactory replacement.

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within CIA be freed, as far as possible, from subordination to administrative officials. This might be accomplished in CIA by raising the Scientific Branch to an office level and making its chief an Assistant Director.

A consideration that makes it difficult to keep qualified scientists in CIA is the undesirability of public acknowledgment of the nature of the activity. The practical result is to create the impression that the individual in question isn't employed by anybody. This makes it difficult for him to attend conferences or write papers, and he soon loses standing in his profession. For these reasons, it is highly desirable that arrangements be made whereby any eminent scientist employed by CIA be given a "cover" position. A currently popular but baseless theory that scientists are inherently insecure is advanced as an argument why individuals responsible for scientific intelligence should be denied opportunities for active association with other scientists at conferences, etc., on any basis. Security would appear to be a matter of individual responsibility. No evidence justifies the conclusion that insecurity is an occupational failing peculiar to scientists.

The activities of Scientific Intelligence should be directed by a scientist and not by some otherwise competent individual whose education and experience in the scientific field is superficial. An educated guess as to the implications of a given scientific development can be made only if the guesser has a real understanding of the potentiality of scientific development. Not only must he be fully

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competent to appreciate the significance of development himself, but, if he is to be effective, he must be able to convince other scientists that his interpretation of a given development is reasonable. He must speak the scientific language.

Security considerations occasioned the divorce between the group in CIA concerned with atomic energy and the Scientific Branch. It was felt that individuals concerned with developments in the atomic field should be strictly isolated. Present arrangements for intelligence relating to atomic energy seem to be working more smoothly than those in other scientific fields although the collection of foreign information is slow and difficult, and our atomic energy intelligence is by no means adequate.

Logic suggests that at some future time responsibility for all scientific intelligence be centralized. An immediate reorganization for this purpose would probably be premature and simply retard the development of atomic intelligence without contributing to the improvement of scientific intelligence generally.

Vigorous action is imperative to improve all facilities for evaluating and stimulating the collection of scientific intelligence. Outside the field of atomic energy this must be done by increasing the authority and support given to the official responsible for scientific intelligence within CIA whether he remain on a branch or be raised to an office level. Non-technical as well as technical intelligence information contributes to the evaluation of foreign scientific developments. For this reason scientific intelligence including

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medical intelligence should be evaluated centrally where intelligence information of all kinds is immediately available.

Evaluation of Operations and Location of Counterespionage

For security reasons no attempt has been made at a detailed analysis or appraisal of the clandestine operational activities of CIA. Senior officers of the government who testified before the Committee on the National Security Organization expressed themselves as fairly well satisfied with the necessarily slow progress in this field, although there was a distinct feeling that progress could be more rapid. Even this limited satisfaction is not echoed in lower ranks.

The counterespionage activities of CIA abroad appear properly integrated with CIA's other clandestine operations. Although arguments have been made in favor of extending CIA's authority to include responsibility for counterespionage in this Country, such an extension of jurisdiction does not at present appear justified. For one thing, concentration of power over counterespionage activities at home in the hands of a Director of Central Intelligence responsible for espionage abroad might justifiably arouse public suspicion and opposition. Conceivably it could form the basis for a charge that a gestapo is in process of creation even though the power to arrest were specifically withheld. To transfer responsibility for domestic counterespionage from the FBI, which has an established organization and long tradition, to CIA, which is not equipped for the assignment, would probably create more problems than it would solve. It is

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doubtful whether the logical benefit of having one agency responsible for counterespionage throughout the world would justify the dislocation and confusion that such a transfer would inevitably occasion.

CIA representatives have indicated that their present working liaison with FBI is satisfactory, but the Committee doubts that FBI-CIA relationships are completely adequate. The Director of FBI declined the Committee's invitation to appear before it to discuss the CIA with the committee or its representatives on the ground that he knew too little of its activities.

Budget and Administration

CIA's budget is a guarded secret. Present arrangements appear to work satisfactorily. The interested services participate in requests for the allocation of funds to CIA. The amounts requested are reviewed by representatives of the Bureau of the Budget designated for the purpose and controlled by appropriate committees of the Congress in closed session. CIA has requested amplying and implementing legislation (S. 2686, introduced but not acted upon during the 2d session of the 80th Congress) to define better its powers and to simplify administration and payment of some of its employees. Most of the provisions of this legislation would confer upon CIA that administrative flexibility and anonymity that are essential to satisfactory intelligence, but some of them seem to involve undesirably broad grants of power for the new agency. Congress should examine this proposed legislation carefully, modify it as seems necessary, and act upon it as soon as possible.

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Security Legislation

The CIA, the FBI, and the services have periodically suggested revision of the Nation's espionage laws to reduce the difficult legal burdens of securing convictions under these statutes. Detailed suggestions for revision of the present law, which would permit conviction irrespective of proof of intent to injure the Government, probably will be presented to the next session of Congress. This Committee sympathizes with CIA and other agencies of the Government in their desire to protect themselves against dangerous disclosures by indiscreet and irresponsible persons, and it recognizes the need for more effective counterespionage protection. The Committee has not examined the proposed revision of the espionage laws nor is it competent to judge them. The Committee feels strongly, however, that better protection for essential Government secrets does not lie in legislation alone. Counterespionage is a difficult art, and it has not always been well practiced in this Country. Strengthening of the FBI, the Counter Intelligence Corps of the Army, and CIA's own internal security is important regardless of new laws. Revision of the espionage laws to remove the necessity of proof of intent might broaden the Act to such an extent as to constitute a peril to our concepts of freedom. Such proposals should be examined most carefully by Congress.

The Committee is of the firm opinion that there must be major improvement in all our intelligence services. This cannot be achieved overnight; time is required to build a good intelligence service. A

* See Chapter XIV, Civil Defense, Internal Security, etc.

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proper selection of personnel and a well thought-out program for their assignment and training are essential--particularly in the Army.

The general framework of our intelligence organization is soundly conceived. The pertinent agencies are aware of its assets and liabilities, of its virtues and shortcomings. The National Security Council, which has properly concerned itself with CIA, should give more thought and attention to the relationships of CIA with other intelligence agencies and working through the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, should encourage the improvement of other intelligence agencies.

Such of the reforms suggested by this survey, and by the Dulles Committee, as are accepted, should be made promptly, but when action has been taken, CIA and other Government intelligence agencies should be permitted a period of internal development free from the disruption of continual examination and as free as possible from publicity.

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